2014年6月13日星期五

华氏1989:中国抹除天安门的记忆(德国《明镜周刊 Der Spiegel 》专访章立凡)

    Fahrenheit 1989: China Erases Memories of Tiananmen

    By Bernhard Zand in Beijing

    Twenty-five years ago, the Chinese army violently suppressed protests on Tiananmen Square. To this day, Beijing uses pressure, censorship and money to stifle all attempts to commemorate the seminal incident in an up-and-coming China.

    Hu Yaobang, 73, a reformer and one of the few politicians the Chinese have ever genuinely worshiped, died on April 15, 1989. As the party leaders who had toppled him from his position as general secretary two years earlier carried him to his grave, some 100,000 students gathered on Tiananmen Square and demanded Hu's rehabilitation. The incident marked the beginning of the revolutionary events of 1989 in faraway Beijing.

    On the evening after Hu's death, his son asked his friend Zhang Lifan, a historian, to document the coming days and weeks. He told Zhang that members of the Hu family were too exhausted to do it themselves.

    Today Zhang, who was 38 at the time, is one of China's leading intellectuals. He had 300,000 followers until last November, when censors shut down his blog. Zhang is a tall, kind and playful, 63-year-old man. When he is searching for a word or a memory, he tilts his head to one side and presses his left hand to his forehead. He wears a silver skull ring, a memento mori given to him by a Buddhist monk.

    In the weeks following April 15, 1989, Zhang would become far more deeply involved in the events that were unfolding than he might have suspected on the evening after Hu Yaobang's death. He has waited almost a quarter of a century to publish part of his memoirs and talk about his experiences publicly.

    "I felt cold on the morning of the funeral," he says. "There were thousands of demonstrators outside, while inside the building supreme leader Deng Xiaoping, that 84-year-old who had had his hair dyed once again, was stomping around like some angry young man. I was standing right next to him. He was determined and ready for a fight."

    In the spring of 1989 Deng, who had fallen out of favor twice during the Cultural Revolution, saw his life's work being threatened: the economic opening of China under party dominance. "He knew that he would not experience a third comeback," says Zhang. "That fear led to the suppression of the unrest on Tiananmen."

    'Enforced Amnesia'

    During the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, tens of thousands of academics, artists and writers were banished or even beaten to death. "I knew what sort of trouble words could get me into," says Zhang, "and I had stopped keeping a diary years earlier." Nevertheless, he agreed to accept the request from Hu's family. "Historians rarely have the opportunity to witness an event that shapes history."

    It was indeed an event that made history. Europe is marking the 25th anniversary of an important turning point in 2014. While Germany commemorates the fall of the Berlin Wall, the countries of the former Eastern bloc are celebrating their liberation from communism. But China's leaders see no reason to commemorate the protests that began at their palace gates and swept into the streets for the first time in 1989. The country's name still identifies China as a people's republic today, and according to its history books, nothing of any significance happened there 25 years ago. When the number "1989" is typed into Baidu Baike, a Chinese version of the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, one of the responses reads: "1989 is the number between 1988 and 1990."

    The leadership isn't just ignoring an anniversary. In fact, it has erased the incident from the collective memory, despite its profound impact on China's current intellectual elite. Sinologist Frank Dikötter describes the government's policy as "enforced amnesia". Authoritarian countries, of course, have a habit of dismissing historic facts.

    Ironically, though, China's Communist Party takes its version of history very seriously. Party officials constantly invoke history in their speeches, and since 1989 dozens of professorships in history have been established, days of remembrance have been introduced and countless conferences have been held. "To forget history is treachery," states an anthology of contributions to one of these conferences.

    Nevertheless, the party quashes any attempt to force it to face up to its own history, one that includes the hundreds killed in the Tiananmen massacre and the millions who died in mass campaigns during the years under former leader Mao Zedong through the land reform, the "Giant Leap Forward" and the Cultural Revolution.

    Unparalleled Negation

    Even among authoritarian countries, China's negation of its own contemporary history is historically unparalleled. In the 25 years since Tiananmen, the country has not only taken off economically, but has also experienced a cultural explosion. And yet China's publishing houses and film studios, along with its universities, think tanks, museums and Internet companies, are producing culture devoid of much of its own history. China's version of Ray Bradbury's dystopian novel "Fahrenheit 451" could very well be called Fahrenheit 1989, a society in which the regime has deleted all unpleasant memories, so that millions of young Chinese today have no idea what happened on Tiananmen Square.

    A week after the memorial service for Hu Yaobang, Zhang Lifan received a second request, this time from the government. Then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had been invited to visit Beijing, but the regime didn't want his reception to be tainted by thousands of people protesting outside. Men like Zhang, a lecturer at the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences at the time, knew the students. The government asked him to serve as an intermediary.

    "Weeks earlier, I had met and debated with students in a student apartment in Dasuzhou Alley," says Zhang. On a day in May, 25 years later, he and his wife are searching for the apartment near Tiananmen where he met with the students. But their search is unsuccessful. Like most buildings near the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen Gate), those in Dasuzhou Alley are now occupied by party officials and their families. There are high walls, imposing portals and security cameras everywhere. When Zhang stops walking for a moment and points to where the apartment was, a couple emerges from a crowd of tourists and photographs him. It's obvious that they are plainclothes agents.

    Zhang, undeterred, continues his account: "I spent days rushing back and forth between Tiananmen Square and the office of the United Work Front, which was supposed to communicate with the students. I didn't get much sleep."

    Division in Both Camps

    He noticed signs of divisions in both camps from the very beginning, says Zhang. In the government, he explains, the reformers were losing ground to the hawks. Among the students, the thousands of new demonstrators arriving every day were applying growing pressure on the core group, which had persevered on Tiananmen Square from the beginning and was willing to negotiate a withdrawal.

    Shortly before martial law was imposed, Zhang guided one of the government's chief negotiators through the checkpoints to the demonstrators' main tent.

    "We all sat on the ground, and one of the student leaders introduced the chief of the delegation to his people. 'This here is Yan Mingfu of the Workers' Front,' he said, 'a good man from the system. Listen to what he has to say, and give the reformers a chance.' But then Yan Mingfu kicked him. It was already dangerous at the time to be called a 'reformer'."

    On the next day, May 19, the demonstrators voted on a bus whether to clear the square. The outcome was negative. "I ran over to the official in charge. He was surprised, because he thought the government had been given different signals," says Zhang. That evening, the students requested another meeting with the government, and Zhang took them to see the official. "The tone had changed radically within a few hours. Now the official asked: 'What else is there to discuss? Go back and see what's on TV."

    Premier Li Peng had gone on television to declare martial law. "That put an end to my mission," says Zhang. "I was disappointed by both sides, because I knew what a historic opportunity had now been lost."

    Immediate Efforts to Obfuscate the Massacre

    On the night of June 3, 1989, the army advanced on Tiananmen Square. Hundreds of protestors who couldn't have imagined that the soldiers would obey orders to open fire died in Beijing, and hundreds more were killed outside the capital. The exact death toll is unknown to this day. Efforts to obfuscate the massacre began immediately after it had occurred.

    Many of the prominent student leaders managed to flee abroad. Those demonstrators who were arrested disappeared into prisons for months or even years, and many were sentenced to death. Those who publicly declared their solidarity with the protestors, like a few prominent journalists, were demoted or fired. Party leader Zhao Ziyang who, as Zhang later discovered, had requested his and other academics' assistance, was deposed and placed under house arrest. He died in 2005.

    But the determining factor in the disappearance of the Tiananmen massacre from China's public memory was the way the regime dealt with the hundreds of thousands of sympathizers in Chinese schools and universities  the 1989 generation, which now forms the core of China as a cultural nation.

    "Sometime that fall, we were summoned by the academy," says Zhang. "We were told to sit in a circle and deliver our reports. When it was my turn, they said: 'Comrade Zhang Lifan! What have you done?' In response, I asked: 'Is that a question or an order?' It was an order, and of course I had done more than anyone else."

    Life after Tiananmen

    He says he received daily visits from the police after that. The interrogations became increasingly harsh, and Zhang feared that he would be arrested any day. "Instead, the mood suddenly shifted. University grants and conference and research budgets increased, and academia blossomed," he recalls.

    Throughout the country, historians began writing entire libraries full of essays and books about China's humiliation in the opium wars, the history of Marxism and the rise of the Chinese nation under the Communist Party. "Most of its was completely worthless from an academic standpoint, and it didn't hold up as a historical narrative, either."

    Zhang continued to work for a period of time. "I still remember what I said in parting: You and I, we no longer belong in the same wok. We no longer fit together." Since then, he has been writing his blog and occasionally publishing a book or an essay, such as his memories of the funeral of Hu Yaobang published last year in the magazine Yanhuang Chunqiu, which prompted complaints to the editors by government censors. "Those who do not participate in writing the official account of this country's history have to think very carefully about what they are writing and how much of a risk they are taking," says Zhang.

    Since the suppression of the Tiananmen uprising, the power of the Communist Party has relied on four pillars, writes China expert Minxin Pei: robust growth, sophisticated repression, state-sponsored nationalism and co-opting of social elites.

    China's intellectuals play a key role in this power structure, voluntarily or involuntarily. They benefit from the economic boom more than most Chinese, and they are both victims of the censorship and surveillance state and authors of a powerful account of the greatness of the nation, the rise of the party and victory over China's enemies  an account that excludes all mention of the disasters and mountains of bodies littering the country's history.

    Oliver Stone: Deal with Your History

    In mid-April, on the 25th anniversary of the death of reformer Hu Yaobang, Beijing's cultural establishment listened to what one of the biggest fans of China among the West's creative classes, the history-obsessed US director Oliver Stone, had to say. He had been invited to speak about cooperation between Hollywood and the Chinese film industry at the Beijing International Film Festival.

    Stone's message was unheard of, at least publicly. Before any meaningful cooperation between Hollywood and China's studios could take place, he said, the country would have to finally come to terms with its historical material. "Mao Zedong has been lionized in dozens and dozens of Chinese films, but never criticized," he told them. "It's about time. You got to make a movie about Mao, about the Cultural Revolution. You do that, you open up, you stir the waters and you allow true creativity to emerge in this country."

    He could understand Beijing's studio heads avoiding subjects like Tibet or unrest in the Xinjiang region, he said. "But not your history, for Christ's sake."

    The audience applauded.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/how-china-is-erasing-memories-of-tianenmen-a-973885.html

章立凡:政治遗产与历史真相


政治遗产与历史真相


章立凡

 

今年415日,是中共已故领导人胡耀邦逝世二十五周年纪念日。1989年因胡耀邦逝世而引发的“六四”事件,也即将迎来四分之一世纪的祭奠。

411日,前总书记胡锦涛偕夫人参拜浏阳胡耀邦故居,向胡耀邦铜像三鞠躬。这次访问临近敏感时段,其间透露的政治信息,引发了朝野各方的种种猜测,一般被解读为团派对太子党“打老虎”的支持,甚至产生“六四”即将平反的幻觉。笔者认为,此事主要与尘封已久的胡耀邦政治遗产有关。

 

政治遗产,有正有负

 

政治遗产有正有负。对于政治上的负资产,中共一直舍不得丢弃,而正资产却一直不敢盘活。

去年12月“毛诞”前夕,我在接受BBC访问时指出:“毛泽东实际上是中共的一个负资产。”毛的政治罪恶在于中断了中国走向民主宪政的进程,把国家引入了阶级斗争、一党专政的死胡同,从反右到文革,他不断以政治运动治国,最终把全国人民拖入一场史无前例的浩劫。在经济方面,毛背弃了发展私营资本主义经济、耕者有其田等承诺,使中共变成了最大的地主和最大的资本家。他发动的大跃进,造成了惨绝人寰的大饥荒。

毛泽东的遗产,就是他建立的一党专政体制。主政者无法切割负资产,症结在于党国不分、党政不分,误以为抛弃毛等于否定执政的合法性,殊不知一个反人类反文明的政治人物,其历史罪人的地位是万劫不复的。在党派利益至上的狭隘格局下,提出“两个三十年互不否定”无异于作茧自缚,连执政理论都无法自圆,遑论“三个自信”?

胡耀邦是国际共运史上稀有的人道主义者。廉洁、开明、亲民、富于创新思维和改革勇气,是胡耀邦的政治遗产,也是中共最大的一笔优良资产。1989419日,我在参加《世界经济导报》、《新观察》联合举办的悼念座谈会时曾率先提出:“耀邦同志留下了宝贵的政治遗产,我感到十分忧虑和悲哀的是,在这样一个重大的历史关头,谁能有资格继承他的遗产。”

二十五年过去,这笔正资产仍处于封存状态。重新评价胡耀邦,必将在政治上得分,有助于扭转执政党因贪腐而日益颓败的政治形象;而纠结则在于由此产生的一系列政治难题:“六四”事件、赵紫阳的评价、继任领导人的合法性……等等等等。

胡耀邦是中共团派的祖师,胡、温上位皆源于其识拔;同时由于他大力平反冤假错案,也成了众多太子党感恩的人物。2005年胡锦涛艰难地作出纪念胡耀邦诞辰九十周年的决定,而其本人则以出访为由未出席座谈会。这次参拜耀邦故居,既是一种还愿的姿态,同时也是一种政治亮相,意在宣示团派的能量与实力。但胡耀邦政治遗产的归属,并不能因此确定,更没有盘活的时间表。

 

政治博弈,“三国演义”

 

按当今社会流行的说法,中共高层有三种政治力量:团派、太子党、上海帮。从中国大历史的角度解读,团派相当于科举取士,出身草根而人多势众。太子党相当于门阀世家,人丁不旺但政治资本雄厚。地方派系进入中央则与高层内乱有关,“文革”中和“六四”后两次出现“上海帮”,皆有特殊的历史背景,属于中共党史上的异数。

胡锦涛以邓小平“隔代指定”的地位继承大统,本非上海帮所愿;胡受太上干政挟制,十年任期无所作为。从中共十七大前夕开始,鹬蚌相争的储君争夺战即已开始。上海帮流年不利,迭遭陈良宇落马、黄菊病故的挫折,而团派接班人选李克强也遭遇到顽强阻击,太子党才有机会坐收储君之席。十八大期间,上海帮的阻击令团派人事布局临门生变,李源潮、汪洋未能入常,仅李克强成为常委兼总理。可以说是上海帮与团派的对峙,造就了以太子党为主导的“皇族内阁”格局。

本届七名政治局常委任期届满时,将有五人退休。团派在中央委员会和政治局已占有多数席位,全面接班的基本盘已经形成。上海帮后继乏人,若本届期间博弈落败,恐难保持队形。太子党人丁不旺年龄偏大,相当一部分人及子嗣已定居海外享受富足生活,无意于国内政治,即便紧急提拔“红三代”,也未必能赶上权力末班车。

20133月,我曾在《盘整还是破局》一文中预测:“历史留给‘红二代’重振祖业的时间,看来只有五年。五年内若只见盘整不见破局,或将失去最后的历史机会。”按正常的权力交接程序,十九大将出现以团派为主体的执政班底。太子党要想继续主导政局,就必须改变现有权力格局,延长权力年限。新出台的“小组治国”执政模式,权力集于最高领导人一身,在某种意义上是对“常委治国”模式的解构,同时也在为十九大人事预作安排。

“以退为进”是常用的政治谋略。兼具太子党身份的上海帮二号人物曾庆红,在十七大人事竞争中退出,将储君之位让与太子党,以维系大佬干政的传统格局。储君在十八大前夕,也采用了这一策略,得以成功上位。而胡锦涛在十八大以自身“裸退”为代价力破此局,作为送给太子党的政治礼物,同时给团派东山再起埋下伏笔。风水轮流转,太子党上台后,举反贪大旗反戈一击,以原教旨主义的激情打虎救党,恐怕是上海帮选定储君时始料未及的。当太子党打虎打成了骑虎之局时,团派的重要性又逐渐凸显。

历史上的“楚汉相争”,终不免打破平衡一决雌雄;而“三国演义”重在借力使力,第三方审时度势袒左袒右,则可维持均势以求共存。体制内未来的权力博弈会重演怎样的历史故事,目下还很难说……

 

纪念耀邦易,平反“六四”难

 

明年将迎来胡耀邦诞辰一百周年,胡锦涛朝拜耀邦故居,犹若刘备归宗汉室正统,具有“占位”的象征意义。

此举在民间燃起重新评价胡赵、平反“六四”的遐想,近期习近平访问北大且与支持过民运的老教授合影,也引发了过度的揣测,但很足以说明人心向背。其实对中共而言,这是一把攥在手中多年打不出的政治大牌,很可能过期作废。大清王朝崩溃的时候,不会有人去感恩光绪皇帝和戊戌变法。

上海帮作为“六四”事件的受益者,当权时期没有出牌。团派柄政后本有机会名正言顺地出牌,但上海帮似乎不情愿此牌由团派打出;2005年胡耀邦九十周年纪念,曾庆红代表中央的发言,维持了1989年耀邦悼词中的评价,同时也给了家属和团派面子。当然,有很多太子党对胡耀邦心念旧恩,就习近平而言,习仲勋与胡耀邦的政治友谊,本身就是重要的政治遗产。

鲁迅诗云:“静默三分钟,各自想拳经。”尽管各有利害盘算,但永远执政是三派的共同底线。纪念耀邦易,平反“六四”难,当下形势比人强,由此引发的骨牌效应风险难料,丢失政权的责任是谁都无法承受的。

在我认识的体制内人物中,无论职位高低、有权无权,私下都承认“六四”事件是执政党的历史欠债,将来总有一天会平反。过去曾有媒体多次问及我对平反“六四”的预测,我的说法是:最佳时机已经错失,矛盾交织积重难返,今后在两种情况下有可能平反:一、权力地位稳固之后作锦上添花,花信遥遥无期;二、重大危机出现之时当救命稻草,为时或许已晚。

公道自在人心,历史自有公论。四分之一世纪过去,有死难者亲属表示,无合法性的“恩赐平反”已不重要。

 

没有真相,永无和解

 

近日在北京的一间民宅里,十几位学者、当事人和死难者亲属一起探讨历史真相,背景是一条“2014·北京六四纪念研讨会”的红色横幅。事后多人被警方传唤,五人遭刑拘,被控“寻衅滋事罪”。坐牢者求仁得仁,于心无愧;而有司在敏感时刻的过度反应,不仅开创了共和国司法史上“闭门家中坐,罪从天上来”的先例,也使二十五年前的历史事件,再次处于国内外舆论的风口浪尖。

不断收紧的意识形态和言论环境,令执政党进入三十多年来与知识界关系最差的时期。自由空气的稀薄,令很多人不仅怀念胡赵的八十年代,甚至觉得江朱、胡温时期都比当下“自由”。明智的政治家宁挑战政敌,不挑战舆论,四面出击不代表“亮剑”成功。朝中有人在等待主政者的失败,更有“高级黑”借力使力激化矛盾,上楼抽梯断其后路。

“从来不需要想起,永远也不会忘记”,当年的“六四”一代,已成为当下的社会主流,历史的伤口在滴血,青春的记忆仍是解不开的心结。“六四”纪念日也俨然成为“国家例假”,官方年复一年高度戒备。历史债务拖延越久,需要偿还的本息越高,这种朝野揪心的噩梦,不知何年何月才能解脱。

如果改革是最大公约数,则革命就是一切归零。社会危机越是深重,政治遗产就越显得重要,历史记忆也越容易被唤醒。以胡锦涛朝拜耀邦故居为契机,体制内外都在有意无意地激活话题。未来中国需要一个南非式的“真相与和解委员会”,独立调查自1949年以来土改、“反右”、大饥荒、“文革”、“六四”等历史事件的真相。

历史潮流不可逆,中华民族迟早要面对真实的历史,没有真相,永无和解。

 

                    2014510 北京风雨读书楼

                    《明报月刊》20145月号